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Modern monetary economics associates lender of last resort activities with a 
central bank.  The United States during the National Banking era (1863-1913) had no 
central bank and lacked a reliable way to increase the stock of high-powered money 
quickly. Yet during the Panic of 1907 the six largest national banks in New York City 
collectively and intentionally engaged in lender of last resort activities, without a 
statutory mandate or formal institutional arrangements to enable them to do so.  Through 
the New York Clearing House, the big six national banks borrowed clearing house loan 
certificates in amounts that appear to have exceeded their own private needs, providing 
liquidity for the entire New York money market. While interpreting this as evidence of 
intentional lender of last resort behavior is open to interpretation, it is clear that the 
private behavior of the Big 6 banks was aligned with the collective interest.  The New 
York Clearing House by approving the loan requests and the big six banks by borrowing 
the loan certificates provide an example of private provision of liquidity during a 
financial crisis. 
We focus on the liquidity provided by the big six nationally chartered banks-- 
National City, National Bank of Commerce, First National, National Park, Hanover, and 
Chase National.
1   The six biggest banks in New York City account for over 70 percent of 
the clearing house loan certificates issued by member national banks in 1907, whereas 
they provided just over half of the loan volume of all New York City national banks. The 
                                                 
1 These banks comprised nearly 60 percent of the total assets of New York City national banks.  See Table 
1 for additional evidence on the extent of the big six bank dominance of New York City financial activity.   2
big six banks were crucial for clearing inter-regional payments; they were storehouses for 
interior bank deposits and accounted for nearly 80 percent of the net liabilities to banks 
(correspondent bank deposits in New York City banks) held by New York City national 
banks.
2  In 1907, it was essential that the largest New York City national banks requested 
clearing house loan certificates from the Clearing House because the aggregate resources 
of the other, smaller banks were likely insufficient to provide the credit necessary to 
generate the liquidity to alleviate a crisis. The dominance of the large national banks in 
New York City in 1907 offers a contrast to an observation from the issuance of clearing 
house loan certificates in 1873 in New York City.  In 1873, banking assets in New York 
City were not as highly concentrated and the big national banks required cooperation 
from a large number of smaller banking organizations to issue a sufficient volume of loan 
certificates.  By 1907, the large, national banks in New York City were the only 
participants with the resources sufficient to affect aggregate liquidity.  
We examine clearing house loan certificates issued during the Panic of 1907 
among New York Clearing House member banks by exploiting underutilized data that list 
the borrowing bank identity, the loan amount, and the issue date.  The existing research, 
to our knowledge, has not examined high frequency data for clearing house loan 
certificate issues at the borrower level.  We emphasize the high frequency time series 
behavior of the data because the rapid issue of a large quantity of clearing house loan 
certificates was an important and necessary response to quell the panic.  
                                                 
2 We have not determined the proportion of banker balances held by New York City national banks that 
were deposits by smaller, non-New York City banks. The deposits placed in New York City national banks 
by other, usually smaller national banks in the interior of the country qualified as legal reserves for the 
smaller national banks.  Some of the New York City national bank deposits were those of New York City 
trust companies, which qualified as reserves for trusts.   3
The big six banks engaged in these liquidity-enhancing actions despite binding 
restrictions on the powers of the New York Clearing House.  For example, the New York 
Clearing House was legally prohibited from printing currency, and it was unable to sell or 
buy bonds in quantities comparable to modern open market operations.  There was no 
legal basis for the issuance of clearing house loan certificates and, therefore, they could 
not serve as legal reserves.  These restrictions distinguish the New York Clearing House 
from modern central banking institutions.  Still, the New York City national banks and 
the clearing house loan certificates were comparable to central bank injections of 
temporary liquidity as observed today in periods of extreme liquidity demands.
3 
The severe crisis in 1907 required a rapid liquidity infusion to quell the turbulence 
in the financial market.  The issuance of clearing house loan certificates was the only 
mechanism available to increase the supply of a substitute for specie and legal tender in 
final payments among clearing house members. That substitution would allow the release 
of cash and specie to the general public.  The loan certificates helped prevent the need for 
costly liquidation of bank assets, like call loans – short-term demandable loans backed by 
stock or bond collateral -- in order to satisfy cash withdrawal demands or unfavorable 
clearing balances.   
Clearing house loan certificates were, however, only a temporary provision of 
credit.  For a more durable solution, the financial system required gold inflows to restore 
bank reserves to the legal requirements, but there was a time lag between the arrangement 
for gold import and the arrival of the gold.  It was not until late in December of 1907 
before monetary gold arrived in New York City at a dollar volume comparable to the 
                                                 
3 See McAndrew and Potter (2002) for a detailed description of activities of the Federal Reserve discount 
window function during the week of 9/11.    4
volume of clearing house loan certificates outstanding.  The clearing house loan 
certificate issues were effectively “bridge loans” that enabled the borrowing banks to 
finance the importation of monetary gold.  The loan certificates retained value among the 
Clearing House member banks because they paid interest to the bearer, and they were 
temporary, in anticipation of monetary gold imports arranged by the key financial 
institutions in New York City.   
The Panic of 1907 resulted in extreme financial tightness that altered the typical 
movements of notable high-frequency data, like short-term interest rates and currency 
premiums, spikes in these series are interpreted as indicators of financial market distress. 
We find that the first issues of clearing house loan certificates coincide with spikes in 
such indicators of financial market distress.  Within several weeks of the clearing house 
loan certificate issues, the only notable moderation among these indicators was in the 
interest rate on call money loans, stock market loans backed by the collateral of the 
purchased stock (or bonds).  A return to pre-panic conditions among indicators of 
financial distress took place only after the dollar volume of gold inflows surpassed $100 
million, the restrictions or partial suspension of cash payments was lifted, and the vast 
majority of clearing house loan certificate issues were paid off and cancelled.
4  
 
II.  BACKGROUND ON CLEARING HOUSE LOAN CERTIFICATES 
a)  Clearing house credit extensions to borrowing banks 
 
During financial panics, New York City banks and other financial intermediaries 
faced a widespread increase in demand for cash from individual depositors and from 
interior banks that held deposits with New York City banks.  To adapt to the absence of a 
                                                 
4 Goodhart (1969) makes a similar observation about the crucial role of gold inflows to end the crisis.   5
formal lender of last resort the New York Clearing House banks, as early as 1860, used 
an artificial settlement device -- clearing house loan certificates – as a mechanism to 
provide settlement media for use among Clearing House member banks as an alternative 
to cash and specie. Cannon (1910), Myers (1931), as well as modern authors describe the 
institutional development of clearing house loan certificates during the National Banking 
Era. 
5 6    
The process for issuing clearing house loan certificates relied upon the New York 
Clearing House and began with its decision to issue them.  First, the Executive 
Committee of the New York Clearing House would agree that financial conditions 
warranted the issuance of clearing house loan certificates, which were perceived as an 
aggregate response to limited cash liquidity. Following the decision to issue clearing 
house loan certificates, the Executive Committee would form a loan committee 
comprised of representative members who had the obligation to monitor the quality of 
collateral that was offered by member bank borrowers of clearing house loan certificates.  
Clearing house loan certificates were issues of credit – paper notes that were tradable 
among clearing house members, but non-negotiable in the private economy -- extended 
by the New York Clearing House to member banks who requested them.  The borrowing 
bank placed collateral (commercial paper, bills receivable, as well as stocks and bonds) 
with the New York Clearing House in order to borrow clearing house loan certificates up 
to 75 percent of the market value of the collateral.
7   
                                                 
5 Cannon (1910) describes the use of Clearing House loan certificates in 1860 and throughout the panics of 
the National Banking Era (see pages 75-115).  Myers (1931, pages 98-100) notes also that a similar 
temporary liquidity enhancing technique was used in 1857.   
6 Specie refers to precious metal (silver and gold) coinage. 
7 The collateral assets that backed the clearing house loan certificate issues were heavily discounted in 
order to minimize the potential losses from clearing house loan certificates that could not be terminated by 
the borrowing bank. Cannon (1910 page 119) suggests that in 1907, about 73 percent of the collateral was   6
Clearing house loan certificates were costly to issue; in 1907, the borrowers of 
clearing house loan certificates paid a 6 percent annual rate of interest to the holder of the 
certificate. The payment of interest made the certificates desirable for Clearing House 
banks to hold, and the certificates traded at par with gold and legal tender among banks. 
Clearing house loan certificates were issued in 1907 as an intentionally temporary 
supplement to liquidity, which had a limited time to maturity ranging from one month to 
three months.  However, after maturity the borrower faced progressively rising penalty 
interest rates that were designed to hasten loan repayment (expiration or cancellation).  In 
terms of volume, the New York Clearing House issued over $80 million in clearing house 
loan certificates, which was substantial when compared to New York Clearing House 
member bank reserve holdings that hovered around $250 million around the time of the 
panic. 
The New York Clearing House played the role of intermediary for the credit 
extension and ensured that the borrower paid the interest charge to the holder of the 
clearing house loan certificate. Among other unique characteristics, the clearing house 
loan certificates were explicitly liabilities of the New York Clearing House, that is, the 
loans were backed by the collective assets of the Clearing House member banks, rather 
than backed by the specific assets pledged as collateral from the borrowing bank.
8   
Clearing house loan certificates were then used as substitutes for the exchange of 
cash and specie in settling accounts among members at the Clearing House, and thereby 
                                                                                                                                                 
commercial paper and the other 27 percent was stock, bonds and short-maturity railroad notes. We have 
verified this finding in a primary source from the reports of the New York Clearing House Loan 
Committee; Cannon was the chairperson of the committee. 
8 Gorton and Huang (2001, 2002) infer that the Clearing House loan certificates, as general liabilities of the 
New York Clearing House, were a form of deposit insurance because the depositor who accepts these loan 
certificates in exchange for his or her deposits is exchanging a claim on a single bank for a claim on general 
assets of the Clearing House (the coalition of banks in general).  See also Gorton and Mullineaux (1987).   7
they provided additional volume of a substitute medium for clearing transactions.  
Clearing house loan certificates allowed cash formerly used for settlement to be freed up 
to satisfy other banking needs, such as meeting depositor withdrawals and financing 
additional loans without additional reserve assets.  Given the interest payment, it was 
possible that a receiving bank may have held a clearing house loan certificate in its vault 
to accrue interest. Similarly to clearing balances, vault cash could also be freed up and 
used to satisfy demands from depositors. The certificates were a close but imperfect 
substitute for reserve assets.  The certificates were not a close substitute for legal tender 
because it was illegal to use the clearing house loan certificates as hand to hand currency 
as a cash substitute in any transaction outside of the Clearing House.   
 
b)  Literature on clearing house loan certificates 
Research on liquidity provision during National Banking Era (1863-1913) 
financial crises highlights the aggregate issuance of clearing house loan certificates by the 
New York Clearing House.  Specifically, these works focus on the aggregate issuance, 
the amount used in private transactions, and the duration of their existence as well as their 
use as a device to increase liquidity temporarily (see Andrew 1908, Cannon 1910, 
Timberlake 1978 and 1990, Gorton 1985, and Gorton and Mullineaux 1987).   
As early as Andrew (1908) and Cannon (1910), economic analysis of clearing 
house loan certificates centered on their use as a substitute for cash and for reserves, and 
Cannon noted that the currency available was essentially increased by the full amount of 
the clearing house loan issue.  Other astute contemporary economists, most clearly 
Maurice Muhleman (1908) and O.M.W. Sprague (1910), viewed the decision to issue   8
clearing house loan certificates by the New York Clearing House as a crucial action 
necessary to avert a more serious consequence: the costly premature liquidation of 
illiquid assets, and the potential collapse of economic activity from an inability to 
complete financial transactions. Sprague (1910, page 271) notes “Clearing house loan 
certificates were at length authorized, enabling the banks to meet the local situation, and 
to an even greater extent than in the past, they served this purpose effectively.”  
Muhleman (1908) provides a contemporary view of clearing house loan 
certificates: 
By means of the clearing-house certificates they (New York clearing house 
banks) were enabled to increase the loans, instead of demanding payment; such 
demands would inevitably have aggravated the evil and precipitated serious 
disasters.  The loans were expanded for three distinct purposes: to finance the 
importation of gold, to enable the furnishing of cash to interior banks; to relieve 
interior banks of loans (probably speculative), in the center, which they were 
anxious to get rid of; and to enable the security market to have some means to 
check the ruinous fall in prices, particularly of bonds, which had set in.  By 
supplying loans at reasonable rates, the fall was restricted.  
(Muhleman 1908, page 191) 
 
Timberlake (1984), Gorton (1985), and Gorton and Mullineaux (1987) describe 
and analyze the actions taken by the New York Clearing House (as well as other 
important Clearing House associations) to alleviate financial stress during the National 
Banking Era (1863-1913) crises, highlighting the temporary infusion of liquidity 
provided by the issues of clearing house loan certificates.   
Gorton and Mullineaux (1987) emphasize that the liquidation of call loans, or any 
other illiquid asset, would be costly for banks; clearing house loan certificates were a 
mechanism to liquefy temporarily a discounted amount of illiquid assets. Timberlake 
(1984) provides a detailed description of the process that the Clearing Houses used to   9
issue the certificates.  Timberlake (1984, 1990) as well as Gorton (1985) go further to 
emphasize the central banking role of private clearing houses during the crises of the 
national banking era.
9  In these works, the arguments support a central banking-like 
interpretation of the clearing house actions and emphasize the widespread demand for 
cash withdrawals as the main determinant for requests for clearing house loan 
certificates.     
 
III.  CONCENTRATION OF PAYMENTS IN NEW YORK CITY 
Under the National Banking System, New York City national banks, as central 
reserve city banks, provided explicit reserve storage for interior national banks.  Deposits 
by interior banks held at New York City national banks, known as bankers’ balances, 
were counted by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency as official reserves for the 
interior national banks.  As a result, the New York City financial markets faced a number 
of demands for its cash and liquid assets whenever the financial markets faced a 
widespread contraction.   
By 1907, there was increased concentration of banker balances at the biggest six 
national banks in New York City. Sprague (1910, page 232) notes that in 1873, the 
biggest seven New York City national banks held about 30 percent of New York City 
banker balances; by 1907, the biggest six national banks held over 75 percent of banker 
balances held in New York City.  The increased concentration of banker deposits in New 
                                                 
9  Separately, Taus (1943) and Timberlake (1990) describe how the United States Treasury engaged in 
central banking functions.   10
York City national banks signaled the rising influence of the big six banks in the inter-
regional payments system at that time.
10  
During the National Banking Era, the New York City banking and financial 
markets were the nation’s central money markets. The large New York City banks were 
key coordinator of payments between domestic businesses as well as international 
payments.  As the post-bellum US financial market evolved, James and Weiman (2005) 
describe how interregional payments centralized in New York City.  Banks and firms 
throughout the entire United States exchanged claims on New York City national bank 
balances, thereby making New York City almost the national clearing house for 
payments. The New York City financial markets, most notably the equity markets, were 
central for allocating liquid capital throughout the United States.
11  These observations, 
the latter one shared by both contemporary and present day economists, highlight how the 
decisions of the New York City national banks, specifically the big six New York 
Clearing House member banks, were crucially important for the development and growth 
of the US economy at the turn of the 20




                                                 
10 In periods when Clearing House loan certificates were issued, Cannon (1910, page 79) describes how 
banks took out Clearing House loan certificates “as a patriotic movement” that all member banks should 
embrace “for the welfare of the community as a whole” as opposed to other motives. The notable contrast 
in 1907, noted by Cannon (1910), was that only 60 percent of New York Clearing House member banks 
took out Clearing House loans, compared to nearly complete participation in previous episodes.  The 
concentration of regional deposits in the big six banks by 1907 likely contributed to the lack of full 
participation by smaller (national) banks in Clearing House loan certificates.  Smaller banks relied on the 
larger banks that had more resources as well as more incentives to preserve the system.  See Sprague (1910, 
pages 233-34) for further detail. 
11 Muhleman (1908, pages 117-18) also highlights the central role of New York City national banks in the 
payments system.   11
IV.  CLEARING HOUSE LOAN CERTIFICATES DURING THE PANIC 
We use newly available data on clearing house loan certificates issued to member 
banks in New York City following the onset of the Banking Panic of 1907 to demonstrate 
the crucial role that the big six national bank actions played in generating liquidity for the 
call loan market and bank payment clearing (see Appendix 1).  The data on clearing 
house loan certificates is taken from the Minutes of the New York Clearing House Loan 
Committee and list the amount of each loan, the date issued, and the bank to which the 
loan is issued.  We match the clearing house loan certificate data with balance sheet 
measures for the set of national bank members of the New York Clearing House taken 
from the August 1907 call reports of the United States Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency.  In addition, we collect call report data for the big six New York City national 
banks for the call reports on December 3, 1907 and February 14, 1908 available from the 
records of the New York Clearing House.  Further, we use weekly aggregate numbers for 
New York City national banks from the National Monetary Commission (Table 4, p. 258 
in Andrew 1910) to assess the balance sheet conditions of the New York City financial 
market between call dates.  The call reports contain the standard balance sheet 
information for each of the big six banks, while the weekly National Monetary 
Commission data have aggregate numbers for national banks operating in New York City 
for loans, net deposits (net liabilities to banks plus individual deposits), bank note 
circulation, and reserves (the sum of specie and legal tender).
12  Finally, we compare the 
weekly clearing house loan certificate issues with the net gold inflow figures taken from 
Andrew (1910).    
                                                 
12 The weekly numbers are totals for New York Clearing House member banks so they do not correspond 
exactly to the call report data for New York City national banks.   12
Chart 1 displays net liabilities to banks of individual Clearing House member 
national banks in New York City relative to the total net liabilities of banks of Clearing 
House member national banks in New York City. We plot this data series along with 
clearing house loan certificate issues per bank relative to total clearing house loan 
issuance of Clearing House member national banks in New York City.  The distributions 
for both data transformations are skewed, which reflects the enormous influence of the 
big six banks in both these activities.  The big six New York City national banks account 
for more than 2/3 ($53M of $74M) of the aggregate amount of clearing house loan 
certificates issued to national bank members of the New York Clearing House in 1907.
13  
These banks were also the most important providers of deposit services for interior banks, 
holding nearly 80 percent of net deposits from banks (net liabilities to banks) at New 
York City national banks calculated from the August 1907 call report and listed in Table 
1.  The funds from bank deposits were used to extend call loans at the stock market.  As 
mentioned above, the onset of panic made the rapid issuance of clearing house loan 
certificates important to prevent the undesirable premature sale of illiquid collateral.  
Chart 2 presents the accumulation of clearing house loan certificate issues to 
Clearing House members in New York City for the first week after the New York 
Clearing House agreed to issue them on October 26, 1907.  The total bar includes state 
chartered intermediaries as well as the national bank members.
14  The big six national 
                                                 
13 We examine only the national bank members of the New York Clearing House at this time because we 
do not possess the balance sheet data for the Clearing House member state banks in New York City.  The 
inclusion of state bank information would contribute only $10 million more of the clearing house loan 
certificate issues, and should not affect inferences about the influence of the big six national banks. 
14 We do not include the state bank member Clearing House loan certificates for the remainder of the 
analysis because we lack the balance sheet data for the state bank members.   13
banks account for more than half of the initial issues of clearing house loan certificates.
15  
The large-scale clearing house loan subscription taken by National City Bank is also 
noteworthy because the bank intended to enter the autumn of 1907 in a significantly 
liquid position.
16  Clearing house loan certificates added to National City Banks’ ability 
to increase its loans during the panic. 
Contemporary observers knew that New York City national banks went far below 
their required reserve ratio of 25 percent during the Panic of 1907.  Muhleman (1908, 
pages 191-192) shows that New York Clearing House member banks had $267 million in 
reserves on October 19, 1907, and the level of reserves fell to $216 million on November 
23, 1907.  The timing of the reserve loss, however, is important to note.  By October 26, 
1907, New York Clearing House member bank reserves had only fallen to $254.7 
million, a modest loss of slightly over $12 million.  By the week of November 2, 1907, 
the reserves fell to $224 million, a notable $30 million loss of cash reserves that pushed 
New York Clearing House banks below their required reserve levels.  Chart 3 displays 
reserves of New York Clearing House member banks along with clearing house loan 
certificate issues.  The timing of the reserve decline lines up with the increase in clearing 
house loan certificate issues. Chart 4 displays weekly estimates of the amount that reserve 
levels were below reserves required to support net deposit levels, and compares them 
with the level of clearing house loan certificate issues.  In addition, we display the sum of 
clearing house loan certificate issues and the reserve deficiency as a proxy for net reserve 
                                                 
15 One of the big six, Hanover Bank, took out no Clearing House loan certificates. The Hanover Bank 
President, James Woodward, became the chairman of the executive committee of the New York Clearing 
House as of October 1, 1907, and it was this committee that decided to issue Clearing House loan 
certificates and determined the collateral requirements for each issue.  Hence, the incentives and the 
potential perception of a conflict of interest provide an institutional explanation for the lack of Clearing 
House loan certificate requests from Hanover Bank.  See Wicker (2000, page 98).  
16 Vanderlip Papers. Stillman to Vanderlip, February 12, 1907, and Cleveland and Huertas, The Bank, p. 52.   14
supply to New York City national banks. When we add the level of clearing house loan 
certificates to the reserve deficiency at national banks, we in effect apply the volume of 
clearing house loan certificates as reserve substitutes.  Interpreted in that way, the volume 
of clearing house loan certificates helps explain why the national banks were less 
concerned with cash drains throughout the panic.  
 Financial  market  indicators of distress spiked upward immediately as the panic 
conditions struck New York City. The high-frequency (daily) observations let us assess 
the effect of the timing of clearing house loan certificate issues on the financial market 
stress indicators and relevant measures of bank liquidity. Table 2 displays indicators of 
financial distress observed during the weeks following the onset of the panic, such as the 
ranges for exchange rates on deposits in New York City offered at Chicago and St. Louis, 
the “currency premium” (the premium value of cash over deposit balances) observed in 
New York City, the call loan interest rate, and the effective reserve deficiency among 
New York City national banks.
17  Chart A2 presents the spikes in the call money rate and 
the commercial paper rate.  The peak distress in the stock market, measured by the 
interest rate on call loans, took place in the week of October 26, 1907 prior to the issue of 
clearing house loan certificates.  However, the peak premium for currency in New York 
City on a weekly frequency was November 16, 1907, and ranged from 2.5 to 4 percent. 
Exchange premiums on balances in New York traded in Chicago and St. Louis at near 
their peaks for the weeks November 16 and 23, 1907. The relation between these 
financial market distress signals and the issue of clearing house loan certificates was 
notable, but it is also clear that the issue of clearing house loan certificates was not an 
                                                 
17 Data on the cash premium in New York City and on the range of call loan interest rates were taken from 
Table 29, page 136 in Andrew (1910).  Domestic exchange rates were from Table 15, page 217, Andrew 
(1910). The reserve deficiency is taken calculated from the weekly aggregate numbers described below.   15
immediate palliative to the market unease.  The additional injection of liquidity from 
clearing house loan certificates helped to maintain transactions activity (stock trading 
volume) in the stock market, and likely reduced the call loan interest rate directly.  These 
outcomes were clearly important for the large, New York City national banks.  Nearly 1/3 
of the loans by the big six national banks were allocated to call loans on the stock market. 
 
a)  Timing of Clearing House Loan Certificate Issues 
The largest net outflow of cash reserves from New York City Clearing House 
banks took place in the week immediately following the New York Clearing House 
decision to issue clearing house loan certificates and to restrict the convertibility of 
deposits into cash. The timing of these events is important because the clearing house 
loan certificates provided a substantial volume of a near-substitute clearing balance 
medium.  The use of clearing house loan certificates in the clearing process and the 
acceptance of them by other Clearing House member banks in lieu of legal reserve assets 
allowed the Clearing House members to release cash from New York City. These cash 
outflows were thereby less threatening to the liquidity of the financial markets and the 
daily functioning of the payments system.  Hence, clearing house loan certificates, as 
pseudo-reserves, imperfectly substituted for cash (as settlement balances) and thereby 
partially alleviated the liquidity deficiency.   
New York City national banks increased their levels of deposits and loans during 
the panic at the same time that their reserve balances were run down. These banks were 
required to hold reserves at the level of 25 percent of their net deposit levels, but they 
violated this requirement throughout the Panic of 1907.  Chart 5 displays the changes   16
from week to week in specie and legal tender, in clearing house loan certificates, and in 
loans at New York Clearing House member banks for the weeks of October 19, 1907 
through November 30, 1907.  The chart illustrates how the decline in reserve assets 
(specie and legal tender) coincides with the increase in clearing house loan certificates 
and in loans.  By the end of November, sizable inflows of gold were arriving and adding 
to bank reserves, which leads to the next section. 
 
b)  The Big Six New York City National Banks 
The call report balance sheet data indicates a net contraction of cash reserves at 
the big six banks from August 22, 1907 to December 3, 1907 of nearly $27 million 
($16.7 million in specie, $9.9 million in legal tender).  Despite a contraction in cash 
reserves among the big six banks, these banks borrowed nearly twice that amount ($53 
million) in clearing house loan certificates.
18  The big six banks also increased their loans 
over this period by over $40 million, some of which funded an increase in call loans 
taken over from trust companies (see Muhleman 1908, page 193).  
Chart 6 presents the changes in the specie component of reserves at the big six 
banks individually using call report dates (there were five call dates per year) from 
December 3, 1907 to February 14, 1908.  Over this period, total net increase in specie 
held at the big six banks increased by $48.2 million, whereas the maximum clearing 
house loan certificate issue outstanding for these same banks was $53.2 million.  The 
chart displays changes in specie to the volume of clearing house loan certificates that the 
big six banks took out from the Clearing House.  First, the specie reserves increased 
                                                 
18 The total reserve loss for New York City over the period may have exceeded $50 million See the weekly 
statements on the aggregates for New York City national banks Table 4, page 258 in Andrew (1910).   17
across all six banks from December 1907 to February 1908, even at Hanover Bank, 
which took no clearing house loan certificates. Aside from Hanover Bank, the specie 
reserve increases display positive co-movement with the level of clearing house loan 
certificates taken by each bank.  In two cases, First National Bank and Chase National 
Bank, the totals of clearing house loan certificates and net specie increase is almost the 
same dollar amount.  The observable co-movement between clearing house loan 
certificate issues and the change in specie reserves observed between the call report dates 
is consistent with the interpretation that clearing house loan certificates were like “bridge 
loans” in anticipation of subsequent gold inflows.
19   
Goodhart (1969) emphasizes the role of gold inflows to alleviate the cash shortage 
during the Panic of 1907. Essentially, the stock of high powered money in the United 
States hinged on the domestic stock of monetary gold. Following Goodhart’s lead, we 
describe the relationship between net gold inflows and clearing house loan certificates 
using data listed in Table 3 and displayed in Chart 7. Table 3 shows the accumulation of 
net gold imports into New York City starting from October 12, 1907.  The accumulation 
of net gold inflows had reached just over $39 million by November 23, 1907, which was 
also the week in which the New York City national banks faced their largest reserve 
deficit in this period -- $54.15 million.  At the same time, clearing house loan certificates 
were at their maximum weekly level outstanding at $84.9 million.  Clearing house loan 
certificates and accumulated gold inflows crossed on December 28, 1907, when net gold 
inflows exceeded clearing house loan certificates outstanding. For New York City 
national banks, the reserve deficit became a surplus in the week of January 11, 1908, 
when the accumulation of net gold inflows exceeded $100 million, and clearing house 
                                                 
19 Muhleman (1908) quoted above suggest that clearing house loan certificates enabled the gold imports.   18
loan certificates outstanding were just under $70 million.  By the end of the sample, the 
gold inflows approached their maximum and the reserve positions of the big six banks 
were likely approaching the conditions that are reflected in the February 14, 1908 call 
report. 
Muhleman (1908, p. 110 ) describes the amount of gold and cash that flowed into 
the New York City national banks, and infers the gross amount of cash that flowed out of 
New York City.  Paraphrasing Muhleman, between October 19 and December 31, the US 
Treasury contributed about $46 million, gold imports added about $85 million, and New 
York national banks added about $20 million of their own notes, adding to a total of 
about $151 million, yet reserves were $24 million lower at the end than at the beginning 
of the period.
20  Muhleman’s analysis suggests that hoarding of cash by interior country 
banks from New York City banks approached $200 million.  The costs from such 
hoarding behavior seem measurable and suggest another reason for the New York City 
national banks to reconsider the viability of their continuing to be the de facto lender of 
last resort in the United States.
21 
22 
Chart 8 displays the time series of weekly net gold inflows to New York from 
January 1902 to December 1908.  The shaded area indicates the Panic of 1907 period. 
The net gold inflows during three months of the panic (November and December of 1907 
and January 1908) were the largest observations of net gold inflows observed over this 
                                                 
20 See Muhleman (1908) page 110.   
21 See Wicker (2005) and Moen and Tallman (2007) for a further examination of the banking reform 
movement that followed the panic. 
22 Clearing house loan certificates as a tool to increase liquidity provided the U.S. with a version of lender 
of a last resort, even though the episodes when they were issued reflect a response to an aggregate liquidity 
shortage.  The clearing house loan certificate issue could also address another role for a lender of last 
resort, that is, to provide a mechanism to address individual bank disturbances.  From that perspective, the 
clearing house loan certificate mechanism may have provided the likely inspiration or a crude model for the 
creation of the discount window facility in the Federal Reserve Act. 
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period.
23  The gold inflows were sparked by the currency premium that appeared in 
response to the suspension of convertibility.  The gold standard fixed the dollar/pound 
exchange rate at $4.86656 per pound, but there was a range in which the exchange rate 
could fluctuate with promoting gold imports or exports--the “gold points.”  At a rate 
below $4.8442 it became profitable to import gold.  Immediately after suspension was 
announced sight exchange rate fell to $4.82125, but it was the currency premium which 
made gold imports quite profitable for several weeks after that (Tallman and Moen 2010, 
pp. 12-13).   A simple regression reveals the impact of the currency premium on net gold 
imports (Table 4).  The regression equation is described below: 
be suggestive rather than conclusive.
24  This specification is presented in equation (1) as 
follows:  
NGIt = α + β1 NGIt-1 + β2 GPVt  + β3 CUPRt + ut            (1) 
where:   
NGI = Net gold imports 
GPV = Gold point violations 
CUPR = Currency premium 
And the subscript t refers to the time period. 
 
The first column lists the empirical estimates for a specification that includes only lagged 
net gold imports and the gold point violations variable.  The explanatory power of the 
regression is modest, accounting for less than thirty percent of the variation of net gold 
flows over the period.  When the currency premium is added to the regression, the 
                                                 
23 Using the weekly series on in legal reserves in New York City national banks to normalize the level of 
gold flows does not alter this inference significantly. 
24 Gold inflows to the US from France and Germany were considered important and sizable during 1907.  
See Muhleman 1908, page 195.   20
regression explains over 50 percent of the variation, indicating that the gold inflows 
during the Panic of1907 were a huge component of net gold import (export) variation. 
While the suspension of convertibility created the currency premium that 
provided the incentive to import gold, the issuance of loan certificates provided the 
mechanism that made gold imports possible.  James G. Cannon (1908) explains the 
unrecognized role of loan certificates in facilitating the process of importing gold during 
the panic: 
Very few people realize that in importing gold it is necessary to create a credit on 
the books of a bank, upon which the gold importer may draw, through the 
Clearing House, in payment of the cable transfers and the bills of exchange 
necessary to cover the amount of gold to be brought over.  Clearing house loan 
certificates enabled the banks to make these credits, and that is the reason we 
were able to import such a large volume of gold during the past few months 
(Cannon 1908, p. 111).
25 
Thus, loan certificates provided a means to increase the monetary base separate 
from that of simply releasing cash to panicked depositors.  This function reveals a more 
complex role for loan certificates than is commonly believed. 
 
VII.    CONCLUSIONS 
During the Panic of 1907, the issues of clearing house loan certificates 
demonstrate how coalitions of private banks turned illiquid loan portfolios into liquid 
claims as discussed in Gorton and Huang (2002).  Clearing house loan certificate 
                                                 
25 Sprague (1910) page 191-192 references the same idea in a quote from the Commercial and Financial 
Chronicle,  August 5, 1893, page 196.   21
issuance was an intentional but temporary increase in the monetary base. It was 
intentional because the Clearing House Executive Committee chose to form a clearing 
house loan committee, whose sole purpose was to evaluate collateral and issue clearing 
house loan certificates to member borrowers.  
The credit expansion in the form of clearing house loan certificates maintained 
and supported the intermediation activities of the big six New York City banks, those 
banks that were crucial for the operation of the payments system.   Those same banks 
were also crucial for the operation of the stock market because they were key providers 
of liquidity for the call loan market.  During the Panic of 1907, the big six banks faced 
two crucial risks.  The first risk was asset value risk – the big six bank loan portfolios 
were over 30 percent comprised of call loans, and thereby faced the risk that the stock 
market values backing the loans would fall.  Given the sharp decline in stock market 
values, it was possible that the collateral values fell below the outstanding loan value. 
The second risk was withdrawal risk, the largest component arising from their substantial 
holdings of banker balances.  Combining these two risks arising on each side of the 
balance sheet, the big six banks faced immense challenges during banking panics to 
maintain adequate liquidity to support both a functioning capital market and an effective 
payments system.  As a result, the same big six banks had the highest likelihood of 
borrowing clearing house loan certificates from the Clearing House.   
As the biggest banking institutions in the country, the preservation of a 
functioning payment system was in their best interest.  Clearing house loan certificate 
issues were the only readily available tool to address the volume of final payment media 
during the crisis.  The New York City national banks requested a volume of clearing   22
house loan certificates in excess of their net banker balance contractions.  Here, the 
requests by the big banks for large issues of clearing house loan certificates ensured an 
adequate reserve supply for the entire payment system, not just their own balance sheet 
needs. The excess provision of clearing house loan certificates as reserve substitutes 
reflected the credit enhancement and liquidity creation of the private, New York Clearing 
House coalition, actions that resemble functions normally associated with central banking 
activity.  
 Clearing house loan certificates can be interpreted as “bridge” or emergency loan 
provisions in anticipation of gold inflows, and this interpretation is consistent with earlier 
research (Muhleman 1908, Goodhart 1969).  In addition, the distress signals from the 
financial market conveyed through the premium on cash in New York City, the premium 
on New York City balances within cities in the interior US, and the reserve deficit among 
New York City national banks suggest that the crisis was not quelled by clearing house 
loan certificate issues alone. Gold shipments to New York City from overseas were an 
essential ingredient to fostering a return to calmer financial conditions.  
Foreign creditors shipped gold to the United States because of the existence of the 
currency premium and a perception of the credit-worthiness of the New York City banks 
and of the US financial system more generally.  These certificate issues were credible to 
the public only because there was ample credit available from overseas markets from 
which gold could be imported. International bankers overseas shipped gold to the United 
States because market participants overseas believed that the US would remain on the 
gold standard.  The participants in those overseas markets also perceived that the 
financial system in the United States was in disarray, but essentially solvent.   23
As holders of nearly 80 percent of banker balances held in New York City 
national banks, the big six banks faced the risk of large-scale withdrawal of cash reserves 
from the depositor banks.  The big six national banks in New York City borrowed the 
predominant amount of clearing house loan certificates that enabled them to send cash to 
the interior and prevent call loan contractions during the panic.  However, the volume of 
clearing house loans certificates issued to the large, New York City national banks 
exceeded the net contraction in banker balances that they faced, which we interpret as 
intentional liquidity provision to the financial system.  That the Big 6 banks were 
motivated to protect the general welfare of the banking system is not clear.  Protecting 
their private interest, however, was certainly more aligned with the collective interest 
than in earlier panics.  In this way, the New York Clearing House acted as a private 
liquidity providing institution to increase aggregate base money temporarily during the 
panic. 
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APPENDIX 1:  DATA DESCRIPTION 
 
Data for Clearing House Loan Certificate Issues taken from the Minutes of the Clearing 
House Loan Committee of the New York Clearing House from October 26, 1907 through 
March 21, 1908. These data were initially compiled by Elmus Wicker. Verification and 
additional data on cancellations compiled by Ellis Tallman during a visit to The Clearing 
House, 100 Broad Street, NYC, New York, January 30 and 31, 2007. 
 
Weekly frequency data on New York Clearing House member bank loans, net deposits, 
and specie and legal tender balances taken from ‘Weekly Statements of New York City 
Clearing House (member) Banks’, pages 258-259, Table 4, from Edwin W. Kemmerer, 
Seasonal Variations in Demands for Currency and Capital, Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 1911. 
 
Data on weekly call loan interest rates, premiums on currency in New York City.  Table 
29, pages 136-137, Abraham Piatt Andrew, Statistics for the United States, Government 
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 1911. 
 
Weekly frequency data on gold imports and exports, Table 10, pages 173-176, Part III, 
Statistics on Money, Gold Supply, Foreign and Domestic Cash Money, and Rates on 
Foreign and Domestic Exchange, Andrew, Statistics for the United States. 
 
Data on domestic exchange rates for balances held in New York City, Table 15, pages 
217-218, Part III, Statistics on Money, Gold Supply, Foreign and Domestic Cash Money, 
and Rates on Foreign and Domestic Exchange, Andrew, Statistics for the United States. 
 
Data in appendix on industrial production is from Jeffrey Miron and Christina Romer 
(1991) “A New Monthly Index of Industrial Production, 1884-1940.” Journal of 
Economic History, 50, 321-38. 
 
Data for the stock market index and call and commercial paper rates are from Frederick 
Macaulay, Some Theoretical Problems Suggested by the Movements of Interest Rates, 
Bond Yields and Stock Prices in the United States since 1856, New York: National 
Bureau of Economic Research, 1938.  
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APPENDIX 2:  THE STORY OF THE PANIC OF 1907 
 
 
The Panic of 1907 was precipitated by an unusual sequence of events including 
unwritten but effective restrictions placed as barriers to the free flow of capital to the 
United States (by the Bank of England). The Bank of England restricted the issue of 
American finance bills issued in London typically done in anticipation of the arrival of 
U.S. agricultural shipments.  The restrictions were apparently in response to gold 
outflows from England to the U.S. in 1906, in part caused by the actions of Treasury 
Secretary Leslie Shaw in his attempt to stem an impending domestic U.S. crisis.  
Secretary Shaw subsidized the cost of importing gold into the U.S. from abroad by 
agreeing to pay the shipping costs, thereby lowering the effective gold shipping point.  
The gold outflows from England exacerbated an already significant gold drain from 
England to the US as a result of insurance payments to San Francisco policy holders by 
Lloyds of London (see Odell and Weidenmier 2004).  The 1906 drain of gold from 
England nearly caused a panic in London.  Tallman and Moen (1998) emphasize the 
irregular gold flows in 1907 arising from the Bank of England’s policy, and emphasize 
that there was no quick substitute for gold with another form of base money stock.  
Without an adequate increase of base money, bank credit in New York City was 
constrained and this was especially problematic heading into the autumn harvest and 
shipping season.  
Various culprits have been offered as the underlying causes of the Panic of 1907.  
The financial crisis was largely a result of the combination of the existing financial 
rigidities, the external constraints on base money growth, and hence, restricted growth in   26
credit and deposits along with the decline of stock market asset values throughout 1907 
and flattening or stagnating growth in real activity.  The more flamboyant, proximate 
cause was the failed attempt to corner the stock of United Copper by Augustus M. Heinze 
and Charles W. Morse.
26  The Heinze-Morse affair involved several banks owned by 
Heinze, some of which were members of the Clearing House, which then bankrolled the 
stock corner gambit.  Promptly following the notorious failure, the New York Clearing 
House removed Heinze and his accomplices from the banking industry; Heinze and 
Morse resigned from all their banking interests.  The New York Clearing House promised 
to support member banks and the banks were either liquidated at par or more commonly 
the management was entirely replaced.  These actions took place during the week of 
October 14, 1907, and there were no notable or widespread disruptions to banking 
activities in New York City in that week.  The lack of activity was not surprising because 
the Heinze Morse banking interests totaled only $71 million in assets, relative to the 
aggregate of $1.4 billion in New York City national banks. 
 
THE PANIC OF 1907 IN DATA 
The Panic of 1907 reached a crisis stage on October 21, 1907 following the 
announcement by the National Bank of Commerce (one of the big six national banks) that 
it would no longer act as clearing agent for the Knickerbocker Trust company, the third 
largest trust companies in New York City.  Depositors lined up to withdraw their deposits 
from Knickerbocker Trust, forcing it to suspend operations on the following day, October 
22, after it paid out more than $8 million in cash to depositors.  The total assets of 
                                                 
26 See Strouse (1999), Tallman and Moen (1991), or Woods (2004, Chapter 9).  Of the Heinze-Morse 
banks, the Mercantile National Bank was likely the most important, and its management was replaced by 
the New York Clearing House.   27
Knickerbocker Trust were not so large to precipitate a panic.  However, the closure came 
about without assurances from the New York Clearing House, which indicated a 
distinction between Clearing House member banks and non-member trust companies.
27 
On the following day, Trust Company of America was stricken with a sharp increase in 
depositor withdrawals, and an ad hoc committee of J.P. Morgan, James Stillman, and 
George Baker coordinated efforts to stave off a further spread of financial panic.  On 
October 24, the call loan money interest rate spiked to over 100 percent, an indication of 
the lack of liquidity in the New York City financial markets.  By Saturday, October 26, 
1907, the New York Clearing House committee agreed to issue clearing house loan 
certificates in response to the panic conditions. 
Several general features of the economy and the financial market distinguished 
the 1907 panic from the previous boom years. Studentski and Kroos (1963, page 252) 
refer to the Banking Panic of 1907 as an “exclusively banking” panic, because the source 
of the crisis arose from financial market activities, and hence differed from the previous 
financial panics during the national banking era.
28    
We use several monthly data series to emphasize one main conclusion: that there 
was an increase in the demand for liquidity for which the financial system at the time had 
no simple mechanism to satisfy. 
Chart A1 displays the monthly stock market index value of the Cowles 
Commission along with the monthly Industrial Production Index (Miron and Romer 
1991) from January 1900 to December 1909.  The stock market index peaked prior to 
1907, whereas the IP index peaks closer to the time of the panic and the two series reach 
                                                 
27 For discussion of the isolation of trust companies in New York City, see Moen and Tallman (2000). 
28 See Moen and Tallman (1992, 2000) and Wicker (2000).   28
local nadirs in late 1907. The stock market index declined by over 45 percent from 
November 1906 to November 1907, and the IP index contracted over 30 percent from 
December 1906 to December 1907.   
The decline in stock market values likely limited the use of stock market equity as 
collateral for loan and may have affected interest rates. Chart A2 displays the 6 month 
commercial paper interest rate along with the call money loan interest rate, monthly 
averages from January 1900 to December 1909.  The call money rate was the interest rate 
charged by banks on demandable loans to brokers on the stock market.  These loans were 
collateralized by stock equity at a discount, usually 80 percent of the equity value.  On 
October 24, 1907, during the most intense period of the panic, the call money interest rate 
hit 125 percent at an annual rate.  The October monthly average call money interest rate 
was over 20 percent, whereas the peak commercial paper rate was 7.83 percent in 
December 1907, up from 5.44 in June.  These sharp spikes in interest rates coincide 
roughly with the steep declines in the stock index and the industrial production indexes.   
The sharp spike in interest rates and the sharp fall in stock market values indicate 
a liquidity shortage and one might expect to see a coincident shortage in cash reserves in 
New York City. Chart A3 displays the weekly aggregate net deposits and reserves of 
New York City national banks from January 5, 1907 to December 28, 1907.  This chart 
illustrates the sharp decline in reserve assets and a rise in net deposits from October 19 to 
November 2, 1907 at the onset of the panic.  These charts show a sharp decline in stock 
values, industrial activity, and New York City national bank reserves at the same time 
there is a sharp increase in interest rates.     29
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 Table 1:  Aggregates from National Bank Balance Sheets – Report of the Comptroller of the Currency 
As of August 22, 1907 (In Millions) 
 
 
Balance Sheet Item    Aggregate New York 
City National Banks 
Big Six New York City 
National Banks 
Big Six as Percentage of all  
New York City National 
Banks 
Aggregate of National Banks in United 
States 
        
Loans    771.042  417.384  54.13  4678.584 
Loans to (Due from) banks 
(deposits by these national 
banks held at other banks) 
  188.894  102.954   54.5  614.496 (reserve agents) 
334.571 (other NBs) 
123.020 (state and other) 
1072.087 TOTAL 
Lawful money    218.786  139.916   63.95  531.108 (specie) 
170.516 (legal tender) 
801.624  TOTAL 
Reserve Ratio           26.0  26.3    16.52 
Individual deposits      532.709  285.408  53.58  4319.035 
Due to banks 
(deposits by other banks held at 
these  
National banks) 
    498.031  349.485  70.17  823.680 (national bank) 
 38.139 (reserve agent) 
337.927 (trust and saving) 
395.745 (state bank) 
1595.491 TOTAL 
Net liabilities to banks      309.137  246.531 
 
79.75  523.404 
          
Total Resources    1425.704  836.696  
(10% US total) 
 
58.7 8390.328 Week ending: Call Money Rate Reserve Deficit
low high low high low high low high In millions US $
1907-42 October 19, 1907 -0.2 0.15 -0.6 0.35 0 0 2.25 10 11.175
1907-43 October 26, 1907 -0.25 0.1 -2 0.15 0 0 51 2 5 -1.225
1907-44 November 2, 1907 -0.25 0 -0.3 3.25 133 7 5 -38.825
1907-45 November 9, 1907 0 2.5 2.5 6.5 1 4 42 5 -52
1907-46 November 16, 1907 0.25 2.5 4 8 2.5 4 51 5 -53.725
1907-47 November 23, 1907 1 2.5 6 7.5 1.5 3.5 3.5 15 -54.15
1907-48 November 30, 1907 1227 0.75 1.75 3 12 -53
1907-49 December 7, 1907 01 . 525 . 5 0 . 52 31 3 - 4 6 . 2
1907-50 December 14, 1907 0 0 46 0 . 5 1 . 522 5 - 4 0 . 1
1907-51 December 21, 1907 -0.5 -0.1 35 . 2 5 0.5 1.25 6 17 -31.75
1907-52 December 28, 1907 -0.5 0.5 2 3.5 0.25 1.25 6 25 -20.225
1908-1 January 4, 1908 -0.4 0.6 1 1 0.125 0.375 5 20 -11.6
1908-2 January 11, 1908 -0.5 0.3 -0.75 0.75 0 0 2 9 6
1908-3 January 18, 1908 0.25 0.5 -0.75 0.75 0 0 2.5 6 22.6
1908-4 January 25, 1908 0.15 0.5 -0.25 0.75 0 0 1.5 3 37.1
1908-5 February 1, 1908 0.25 0.3 -1 0.4 0 0 1.5 2 40.5
Emboldened numbers denote observations indicating substantial financial distress.
Table 2: Financial Market Indicators of Distress
Cash balances in New York City Currency Premium
Chicago St. Louis New York City 
Week Week ending: Call Money Rate Net Gold Imports NYCHLoanCerts Reserve Deficit
low high low high Accumulated  Net Outstanding Includes Gold
42 October 19, 1907 0 0 2.25 10 0.018 1.3 11.175
43 October 26, 1907 0 0 51 2 5 -1.285 16.61 -1.225
44 November 2, 1907 133 7 5 -1.765 57.235 -38.825
45 November 9, 1907 144 25 5.508 72.095 -52
46 November 16, 1907 2.5 4 5 15 26.619 80.185 -53.725
47 November 23, 1907 1.5 3.5 3.5 15 39.032 84.885 -54.15
48 November 30, 1907 0.75 1.75 3 12 55.578 84.595 -53
49 December 7, 1907 0.5 2 3 13 69.389 86.97 -46.2
50 December 14, 1907 0.5 1.5 2 25 78.856 87.32 -40.1
51 December 21, 1907 0.5 1.25 6 17 84.560 87.865 -31.75
52 December 28, 1907 0.25 1.25 6 25 88.675 86.495 -20.225
1 January 4, 1908 0.125 0.375 5 20 97.763 80.815 -11.6
2 January 11, 1908 0 0 2 9 101.390 68.345 6
3 January 18, 1908 0 0 2.5 6 101.938 24.12 22.6
4 January 25, 1908 0 0 1.5 3 102.313 6.65 37.1
5 February 1, 1908 0 0 1.5 2 103.095 5.555 40.5
Net Gold Imports, New York Clearing House Loan Certificates, and Reserve Deficit are calculated in millions of US dollars.
Table 3: New York Financial Market Indicators of Distress and Monetary Quantities
Currency Premium
New York City
Emboldened numbers denote observations indicating substantial financial distress.
 Table 4:  Movements in Net Gold Imports into the US  (Monthly Data) 
Equation (1) in Text 
 
NGIt = α + β1 NGIt-1 + β2 GPVt  + β3 CUPRt + ut                
where:   
NGI = Net gold imports 
GPV = Gold point violations 
CUPR = Currency premium 
 
SAMPLE PERIOD:  January 1902 through December 1908 
 
Constant               -0.019       -0.25**
     
                (-0.97)          (-2.40) 
 
Net Gold Imports (Exports) [lagged 1 month]          0.463***       0.58
 ***
   
                (4.19)         (7.17) 
 
Import (Export) Point Violation      -259.62 **    -294.50
 ***   
         (-2.06)       (-2.36)
   
 
Currency Premium            576.69*** 
                       (26.90)     
 
Log Likelihood                   -189.4               -165.28 
N                 83         83 
Adjusted R
2                        0.24          0.57 
 
NOTE:  Estimated by Least squares with heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors. 
*** denotes statistical significance at the 1 percent level. 
**  denotes statistical significance at the 5 percent level. 
 
The currency premium is the average of the daily observations compiled by Andrew (1908).   
 
The import (export) point violation uses the costs of shipping (as compiled by Officer 2010).  
We then calculate values for the points at which exchange rate values would stimulate gold 
import (or gold export).  For this exercise, we use both the bid and ask exchange rates to 
calculate a possible violation. 
 
Net gold imports are in this case positive (inflow of gold) and exports negative (outflow of gold). Chart 1:  Net Liabilities to Banks and Clearing House Loan Certificates: 
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Maximum CHLC as proportion of total Net Liabilities to Banks as proportion of total
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Amount Outstanding Big Six National City Bank CLCs
 Chart 3:  New York City Clearing House Member Reserves versus Clearing 










































Specie and reserves Clearing House Loan Certificates


































Reserve Deficit Clearinghouse Loan Certificate Issues Pseudo-reserves (with CLCs)
































Change in specie and legal tender Change in Clearing House Loan Certificates
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Maximum CLC requested Specie reserves: change from Dec 07 to Feb 08
 Chart 7: New York Clearing House Loan Certificates 
















































Accumulation of Gold Net Imports New York Clearing House Loan Certificates Outstanding
















































































































































































































Shading reflects Panic of 1907
 